Home Sweet Home : Defining a Child\u27s Residence to Establish Original Jurisdiction Cases Involving Family Abduction by unknown
Child and Family Law Journal
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 5
2003
"Home Sweet Home": Defining a Child's Residence
to Establish Original Jurisdiction Cases Involving
Family Abduction
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Child and Family Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.
Recommended Citation
(2003) ""Home Sweet Home": Defining a Child's Residence to Establish Original Jurisdiction Cases Involving Family Abduction,"
Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol1/iss1/5
  142 
“HOME SWEET HOME”: DEFINING A CHILD’S 
RESIDENCE TO ESTABLISH ORIGINAL 




The sudden disappearance of a child is commonly coupled with 
thoughts of the child being lured away by a stranger. Unfortunately, 
society does not recognize that the abductor is often the child’s parent. 
Family abduction, as such an event is referred to, is considered to be a 
serious crime rather than a child custody issue.1 The National Incidence 
Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children 
(NISMART) has defined family abduction as “the taking or keeping of a 
child by a family member in violation of a custody order, a decree, or 
other legitimate custodial rights, where the taking or keeping involved 
some element of concealment, flight, or intent to deprive a lawful 
custodian indefinitely of custodial privileges.”2 
Family abduction generally occurs after a divorce has been filed, 
remarriage has occurred, or one spouse plans a geographic move without 
the other spouse’s consent. 3 In 1999, approximately 203,900 children 
were victims of family abduction.4 Fifty-three percent of such victims 
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1Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Crime 
of Family Abduction: A Child’s and Parent’s Perspective 3 (1st ed. 2010). 
2Heather Hammer et al., National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and 
Thrownaway Children, Children Abducted by Family Members: National Estimates and 
Characteristics 2 (2002). 
3Dorothy S. Huntington, Parental Kidnapping: A New Form of Child Abuse 8 (1984). 
4Hammer et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
2013] Myers 143 
were taken by the child’s father, while twenty-five percent were taken by 
the child’s mother. 5  Even more significant, eighty-two percent of 
parental abductors had the intent to permanently affect custody.6 
Family abduction, from the child’s viewpoint, is considered to be a 
severe form of child abuse.7 Often in these troubled situations the child is 
used as a pawn in the hostile custody battle between separated spouses.8 
Sam F., a family abduction victim, narrated, “[t]hey [the parental 
abductor] stop treating their child as a person, and instead, treat their 
child as a piece of property.”9 Consequently, children in these situations 
become more like “hostages” and have difficulty understanding that he 
or she was removed from a parent who truly loves and desires to 
discover the child’s location.10 Parents may also use the child either as an 
attempt for reconciliation or as an attempt to discredit the non-abducting 
parent by subjecting the child to lies about that parent.11 As a result, a 
sense of guilt is created in the mind of the child who begins to feel that 
the family separation and abduction are his or her fault.12 
Family abduction may also cause the child to lose a sense of self, 
which includes knowing one’s family history and beginnings. 13  Liss, 
another family abduction victim, described, “[f]amily abduction is about 
your family being eradicated from the face of the earth.”14 Long-term 
effects of family abduction on the child include a sense of vulnerability 
and distrust, which can be detrimental to the child.15 Child victims of 
family abduction may also suffer from reactive attachment disorder, 
generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder as 
adults.16 
When family abduction occurs, the abducting parent frequently 
moves the child beyond the jurisdiction of the law governing the child 
custody proceeding. This may be either a domestic or international move, 
and usually occurs in order to obtain a more favorable forum in which to 
                                                                                                             
5Hammer et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
6Id. at 8. 
7Huntington, supra note 3, at 6. 
8Id. at 6-9. 
9Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 
1, at 4. 
10Id. at 4. 
11Huntington, supra note 3, at 4, 9. 
12Nancy Faulkner, Parental Child Abduction is Child Abuse 11 (1999). 
13Id. at 16. 
14Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, supra note 1, at 14. 
15Huntington, supra note 3, at 16. 
16Faulkner, supra note 12, at 1. 
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file the proceeding.17 To confront the increasing occurrence of family 
abduction, the United States and the international community have 
developed approaches to address the problem as related to establishing 
original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. The domestic 
approach implemented the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).18 The international approach implemented 
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (Convention).19 
Each approach has implemented a law based on the primary goal of 
preserving the child’s well-being where the child is most familiar. In 
order to achieve the preservation goal, each approach uses a different 
term to describe the location where the child is most familiar. The 
UCCJEA refers to this location as the child’s home state. 20  The 
Convention refers to this location as the child’s habitual residence. 21 
However, the UCCJEA provides a definition of home state to establish 
original jurisdiction in domestic child custody proceedings. 22 
Conversely, the international approach has failed to define the meaning 
of habitual residence.23 Failure to define this critical term to establish 
original jurisdiction in international child custody proceedings harbors an 
unpredictable interpretation and application of the Convention. Due to 
the importance of the interests at stake, each approach should be 
analyzed to determine whether a defined term of residence to establish 
original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings more adequately 
addresses the needs of child victims of family abduction. 
In this Article, Part II will discuss the domestic approach under the 
UCCJEA and the stringent standard enacted in Section 201(a) for the 
exercise of original jurisdiction in a domestic child custody proceeding. 
Part II will also examine case law to demonstrate how courts determine 
the child’s home state under the UCCJEA. Part III of this Article will 
discuss the international approach under the Convention and the 
guarantee of Article 3 for the exercise of original jurisdiction to be 
                                                                                                             
17Id. at 3. 
18Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act (1997). 
19Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25, 
1980. 
20Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23. 
21Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19, at preamble. 
22Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23. 
23Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19, at preamble (mentioning the term “habitual residence,” but failing to define the term 
or state what qualifies as “habitual residence”). 
2013] Myers 145 
granted to the country of the child’s habitual residence in an international 
child custody proceeding. Part III will also examine case law to 
demonstrate how courts in the United States determine the child’s 
habitual residence under the Convention. Part IV of this Article will 
compare and contrast the UCCJEA and the Convention to consider 
which approach is more effective in granting original jurisdiction in child 
custody proceedings. Finally, a determination will be made as to whether 
the Convention would become more effective if the child’s habitual 
residence were to be defined. 
II. THE DOMESTIC APPROACH: THE UCCJEA 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) first addressed the problem of interstate family abduction by 
promulgating the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 
1968.24 Subsequently, the UCCJA was adopted by all fifty states as part 
of the effort to deter interstate family abductions.25 The fundamental goal 
of the UCCJA was to eliminate interstate competition by permitting only 
one state to exercise jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding.26 The 
federal government also addressed the problem of family abduction in 
1980 by enacting the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)27 to 
promote interstate cooperation by requiring full faith and credit to be 
given to judgments in child custody proceedings in each state. 28 
However, as the American Bar Association’s Center on Children and the 
Law observed, inconsistent interpretation of the UCCJA and difficulties 
with the technical application of the PKPA resulted in the loss of 
nationwide uniformity in child custody proceedings. 29  Accordingly, 
states were unable to achieve the independent goals of either the UCCJA 
or the PKPA laws without violating a provision of the other law.30 
The issues surrounding the UCCJA and PLKA led the NCCUSL to 
draft the UCCJEA in 1997. 31  The American Bar Association (ABA) 
                                                                                                             
24Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18. 
25 Id. 
26David A. Blumberg, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A 
Focused Introduction, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA RESOURCES: 
ARTICLES & PRESENTATIONS, http://www.uccjea.net/resources/documents/lecture-
outline.pdf (last updated July 8, 2012). 
27Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980). 
28Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 1. 
29Id. at 2. 
30Id. at 1. 
31 Id. 
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approved the UCCJEA in 1998.32  Alaska was the first state to adopt the 
UCCJEA in September 1998.33 As of July 2012, forty-nine states, as well 
as the District of Columbia, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have 
adopted the UCCJEA. 34   Massachusetts, the sole state to not have 
adopted the UCCJEA, has a bill pending in the state legislature 
proposing its enactment.35 
The NCCUSL’s principal objective in drafting the UCCJEA was to 
create a clear, yet stringent standard for the exercise of original 
jurisdiction in interstate child custody proceedings.36 In particular, the 
UCCJEA was primarily drafted to protect the child victim from being 
harmed as a result of interstate family abduction. 37  Furthermore, the 
UCCJEA is designed to encourage child custody determinations to be 
made in the state that can most adequately determine the best interest of 
the child, as well as to prevent the re-litigation of child custody issues 
and interstate jurisdictional competition.38 
A. Section 201(a) of the UCCJEA 
Section 201(a) of the UCCJEA provides four exclusive 
jurisdictional bases for a state court to establish original jurisdiction in a 
child custody proceeding.39 First, and most important, a state court can 
make an initial determination in a child custody proceeding if it is the 
home state of a child under Section 201(a)(1).40 A state qualifies as a 
child’s home state if it is the child’s home state on the date the initial 
child custody proceeding is filed. 41  A child’s absence from the state 
within six months prior to filing does not disqualify the state as the 
child’s home state as long as a parent, or person acting as a parent, 
continues to live in the state.42 This “temporary absence” provision is 
designed to preserve a state’s home state status during the period 
required for another state to become the child’s new home state by 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. 
33THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA ADOPTION TABLE, 
http://www.uccjea.net/resources/adoptions.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012); See ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 25.30.300-.910 (1998). 
34THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG: UCCJEA ADOPTION TABLE, 
http://www.uccjea.net/resources/adoptions.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
35Blumberg, supra note 26. 
36Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 1. 
37Id. at 7. 
38Id. at 1. 
39Id. at 24. 
40Id. at 23. 
41 Id. 
42Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23. 
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allowing the state to exercise original jurisdiction if, at any time during 
the six months preceding the filing of the child custody proceeding, the 
state qualified as the child’s home state. 43  Hence, the court must 
determine whether the child lived with a parent, or person acting as a 
parent, in a particular state for at least six consecutive months at any time 
before the child custody proceeding was filed.44 
Second, under Section 201(a)(2), a state court can exercise original 
jurisdiction if another state court does not qualify under Section 
201(a)(1) or if a home state court declines to exercise such jurisdiction in 
a child custody proceeding.45 However, there are two elements that must 
also be shown for a state court to exercise original jurisdiction under 
Section 201(a)(2).46 The first element is for the child and at least one of 
the child’s parents to have a significant connection with the state beyond 
mere physical presence.47 This element is consistent with an underlying 
policy of Section 201 that physical presence is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to enable a state court to make a child custody determination.48 
The second element is for substantial evidence to be available in the state 
sought to be determined as the child’s home state regarding “the child’s 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships” within that state.49 
Third, under Section 201(a)(3), a state court can exercise original 
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding as the more appropriate forum 
for the proceeding if another state court declines to exercise jurisdiction 
under sections 201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2). 50  In addition, each state 
legislature has directed the courts to respect the decision of another state 
court that has properly asserted jurisdiction according to Section 201.51 
Fourth, under Section 201(a)(4), a state court can exercise original 
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding if there is no court of any other 
state that could exercise jurisdiction under Section 201(a)(1), Section 
201(a)(2), or Section 201(a)(3).52 
                                                                                                             
43See, e.g., Sarpel v. Elfanli, 65 So. 3d 1080, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); R.M. v. 
J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 503–504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461, 
466–67 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). 
44Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d at 461. 
45Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48Id. at 26. 
49Id. at 23. 
50 Id. 
51Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308, 314–15 (Tex. App. 2008). 
52Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 24. 
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B. “Home State” Determination 
Courts have recognized its chief objective “is to give effect to the 
purpose of the [A]ct as intended by the Legislature.”53 The intent of the 
UCCJEA in creating a stringent standard to establish original jurisdiction 
in a child custody proceeding is prioritization of the child’s home state, 
which is determined based upon circumstances at the time the suit is 
filed. In making this determination, the location of the child and the 
child’s parents are a crucial element.54 Therefore, to achieve the intent of 
Section 201, courts must literally interpret the UCCJEA by the words’ 
plain and ordinary meaning.55 
Several state courts have held the UCCJEA’s language to be clear 
and unambiguous by defining the child’s home state as the place the 
child has “lived with a parent” for six consecutive months prior to the 
filing of a child custody proceeding.56 For example, in a child custody 
proceeding filed by the child’s mother on April 8, 2010, in Pennsylvania, 
the child was in Pennsylvania uninterrupted from August 22, 2009, until 
March 5, 2010.57 As a result, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld 
the determination of Pennsylvania as the child’s home state because the 
child was in Pennsylvania for six consecutive months prior to the 
commencement of the proceeding by the child’s mother. 58 Therefore, 
Pennsylvania was granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of 
the child custody proceeding.59 
Despite this clear and unambiguous interpretation of the child’s 
home state, other state courts have inquired whether the term “lived with 
a parent” should be objectively or subjectively interpreted. The Supreme 
Court of Texas addressed this issue and determined a subjective intent 
test would frustrate the purpose of the UCCJEA.60 The court found the 
word “lived” was used by the state legislature to avoid such a 
complicated inquiry into the mind of the child or the child’s parents.61 
Therefore, the court held that an objective inquiry of the facts in 
                                                                                                             
53Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 504 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 
68, 75 (R.I. 2001)); See also R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Powell 
v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005). 
54Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 19, at 24; See also In re 
Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. 2011). 
55See, e.g., B.B. v. A.B., 916 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (2011); Sidell, 18 A.3d at 505; Powell, 
165 S.W.3d at 326. 
56See, e.g., R.M., 20 A.3d at 505; Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 326. 
57R.M., 20 A.3d at 498–99. 
58R.M., 20 A.3d at 504. 
59 Id. 
60Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 325–26 (Tex. 2005). 
61 Id. 
2013] Myers 149 
determining original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding creates 
jurisdictional certainty without mitigating the significance of the facts of 
each individual case.62 Based on the objective intent test, the court held 
the mother’s intent to stay in Tennessee with the child for a temporary 
period of time was insufficient to establish Texas as the child’s home 
state. 63 Thus, the court granted Tennessee original jurisdiction as the 
child’s home state in the child custody proceeding because of the child’s 
presence in the state for more than ten months prior to the filing of the 
proceeding.64 The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also implemented the 
objective intent test in child custody proceedings when determining 
original jurisdiction. Specifically, the court found a mother’s future 
intent to live in Hungary did not disqualify Virginia as the children’s 
home state when the children had lived in Virginia for over two-and-a-
half years prior to the filing of the proceeding.65 As a result, Virginia was 
granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody 
proceeding.66 
Several state courts have also interpreted the “temporary absence” 
provision as a protection of both parents, not just the parent who no 
longer lives in the home state.67 Accordingly, the court’s inquiry must 
focus on the individual—whether the child, parent, or person acting as a 
parent—who remains in the home state.68 This provision was analyzed in 
a child custody proceeding in which each parent initiated a proceeding—
the mother in her native Hungary, where she remained with the children, 
and the father in Virginia.69 The Court of Appeals of Virginia found the 
trial court failed to follow requirements of the UCCJEA’s “temporary 
absence” provision by deferring original jurisdiction of the child custody 
proceeding to the Hungarian court.70 The court held that the children’s 
visit to Hungary should have been deemed a temporary absence because 
the children had not been in the country for at least six months to 
establish Hungary as the children’s home state. 71  Therefore, Virginia 
remained the children’s home state as it had been in the six months prior 
                                                                                                             
62Id. at 327–28. 
63Id. at 326. 
64Id. at 322, 328. 
65Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461, 468 n.6 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). 
66Id. at 467–68. 
67Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 325–26 (Tex. 2005). 
68Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 24–25. 
69Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d at 465. 
70 Id. 
71Id. at 468. 
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to the father’s commencement of the child custody proceeding and was 
granted original jurisdiction.72 
Nonetheless, the UCCJEA is not clear in defining all terms relating 
to the establishment of original jurisdiction in a child custody 
proceeding. The UCCJEA fails to define the term “significant 
connection,” which is used when the most appropriate forum must be 
determined because home state jurisdiction is not established under 
Section 201(a)(1). Similar to the inquiry of the “temporary absence” 
provision, a court must focus on the individual remaining in the state 
sought to be determined as the child’s home state. For example, the 
inquiry in a child custody proceeding filed in the Supreme Court of 
Montana focused on the father’s connection to Montana when the mother 
removed the child to Kentucky. 73  The court found that the father’s 
permanent residence, the presence of the child’s extended family, and the 
child’s extensive time spent within the state visiting under the father’s 
custody rights qualified as “significant connections” to Montana. 74 
Therefore, the court determined Montana was the child’s home state and 
granted the State original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child 
custody proceeding.75 
The UCCJEA also fails to define what qualifies as “substantial 
evidence … regarding the child’s care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships” within the state for a state to establish original jurisdiction 
in a child custody proceeding.76 Thus, a court must analyze the facts of 
the individual case to determine if such “substantial evidence” exists to 
support the establishment of a particular state as the child’s home state.77 
An important consideration in this determination is whether the “care, 
protection, training, or personal relationships” in a state have deeply 
impacted the children. 78 For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas 
addressed the “substantial evidence” question in a child custody 
proceeding in which the children had frequently visited Texas, where the 
children’s paternal grandparents also lived.79 After living in Texas for 
four months, the children’s mother removed them to Louisiana.80 The 
court found the evidence within Texas failed to demonstrate a significant 
                                                                                                             
72Id. at 467–68. 
73In re Marriage of Lloyd, 255 P.3d 166, 171 (Mont. 2011). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 18, at 23. 
77In re Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. 2011) 
78Id. at 137. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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effect on the children’s lives to establish Texas as the children’s home 
state. 81 Hence, Texas could not exercise original jurisdiction in the child 
custody proceeding based on the “substantial evidence” provision.82 The 
Court of Appeals of Louisiana has also answered the “substantial 
evidence” question.83 The court found the child’s attendance in school 
and continuous care in Louisiana in the six consecutive months prior to 
the filing of the child custody proceeding was substantial evidence to 
grant Louisiana home state jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding.84 
In determining which state can exercise original jurisdiction in 
interstate child custody proceedings, the UCCJEA has chosen to define 
the child’s home state. While the UCCJEA has chosen to define this 
term, the Convention has failed to define the child’s habitual residence. 
This lack of a definition has led to a different, yet similar, approach in 
determining which country can exercise original jurisdiction in 
international child custody proceedings. However, an analysis must be 
performed to determine whether the Convention’s lack of a defined term 
has a negative impact on the children that the Convention is intended to 
protect. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH: HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE 
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
In 1980, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (Convention) was adopted to address the 
problem of international family abduction as it relates to child custody 
proceedings. 85 A central goal of the Convention is to ensure that the 
custody rights of one ratifying country are competently honored in other 
ratifying countries. 86  Accordingly, the court in which the action is 
brought must determine the child custody proceeding in accordance with 
the terms of the Hague Convention.87 
One of the most common situations that arise under the Convention 
is when one parent attempts to acquire an advantage in a child custody 
                                                                                                             
81In re Marriage of Marsalis, 338 S.W.3d at 137. 
82Id. at 137–38 (however, because no other state court could exercise jurisdiction in the 
case, Texas was permitted to exercise original jurisdiction in the proceeding.). 
83In re A.U.M., 62 So. 3d 185, 188 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
84 Id. 
85Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19. 
86Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19, at art. 1(b). 
87International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(d) (1988). 
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proceeding by moving with the child across international borders. 88 
Ordinarily, the abducting parent seeks exclusive care of the child to earn 
sympathy from the court in the new jurisdiction. 89  The Convention 
attempts to deter such parental behavior by seeking the prompt return of 
a wrongfully removed child to the ratifying country.90 This results in a 
“rapid remedy” to restore the family environment to the state that it was 
prior to the abduction, which protects the non-abducting parent’s custody 
rights. 91  The “rapid remedy” also essentially eliminates the parent 
abductor’s motivation to gain a legal advantage because judicial relief 
will be deprived in the less appropriate jurisdictional forum, which is 
usually the forum where the child is removed.92 
Despite the Convention’s focus on the actions of the parent, the 
Convention principally seeks to protect the abducted children from their 
lives being further altered. 93  The Preamble reflects this goal by 
expressing that the Convention is designed “to protect children 
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or 
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the 
State of their habitual residence as well as to secure protection for rights 
of access.”94 As a result, situations where the child has been removed 
from the family and social environment in which the child’s life has 
developed are sought to be corrected. 95  Ultimately, this goal can be 
achieved if the child is viewed as having individual rights and is no 
longer viewed as property of the child’s parents.96 
                                                                                                             
88Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that “there is a 
central core of matters at which the Hague Convention was aimed: situations where one 
parent attempts to settle a difficult family situation, and obtain an advantage in any 
possible future custody struggle, by returning to the parent’s native country, or country of 
preferred residence.”). 
89Beaumont & McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction 1 
(1999). 
90Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19, at art. 1(a). 
91Shealy v. Shealy, 205 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Karin Wolfe, A Tale of 
Two States: Successes and Failure of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U.J. OF INT’L L. 
& POL. 285, 299 (2000)). 
92Elisa Perez–Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention 
429 ¶ 16 (1982). 
93Id. at 448 ¶ 72. 
94Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
19, at preamble. 
95Perez–Vera, supra note 92, at 428 ¶12. 
96Id. at 431 ¶ 24. 
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Since its adoption, more than fifty countries have ratified the 
Convention.97 The United States ratified the Convention, which has a 
legal status of a treaty, in 1988. 98  As a signatory, the United States 
implemented the Convention by federal statute under the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).99 
A. Article 3 of the Convention 
Article 3 of the Convention requires that the determination of 
whether a child’s removal was wrongful be made under the laws of the 
State in which the child has his or her habitual residence.100 Under the 
Convention, a parent’s rights of custody include, “rights relating to the 
care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine 
the child’s place of residence.”101 The removal of a child is considered 
wrongful when the non-abducting parent’s custody rights—when 
exercised or would have been exercised if not for the child’s removal—
are breached under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence 
immediately preceding the child’s removal. 102  As a result, the non-
abducting parent cannot invoke the Convention unless the abducted child 
is a habitual resident of the signatory country.103 
Accordingly, application of the Convention depends on the 
determination of the child’s habitual residence when the child custody 
proceeding is initially filed.104 Such place is generally where the child is 
most familiar and is within the forum where a court can best serve the 
child’s interests. 105 Under the Convention, a child can only have one 
habitual residence, which must be determined at the time immediately 
prior to the child’s abduction.106 Furthermore, the child’s place of birth is 
not automatically the child’s habitual residence. 107  Once the child’s 
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habitual residence is identified, the Convention guarantees a court in that 
country original jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding and the 
dispute must then be resolved under the laws of that country. 108 The 
Convention then requires the child to be returned to the child’s habitual 
residence if the non-abducting parent files a valid petition within one 
year of the wrongful removal.109 
B. Habitual Residence Determination 
The determination of the child’s habitual residence immediately 
before the wrongful removal is the most difficult issue for a court to 
decide when applying Article 3 in a child custody proceeding.110 This 
difficulty primarily arises due to the Convention’s lack of definition of 
the term habitual residence. 111 The Supreme Court has also failed to 
define the meaning of habitual residence under the Convention when 
applied in child custody proceedings initiated in the United States.112 In 
addition, Congress has encouraged uniform international interpretation of 
the Convention’s terms to provide stability for the child, which it 
believes is part of the Convention’s framework. 113  Hence, courts are 
encouraged to prevent the wrongful removal of the child from “the 
family and social environment in which its life has developed” by 
preserving the child’s habitual residence.114 
Judge M. Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit has suggested 
that habitual residence may have been intentionally left undefined to 
assist courts in creating formalistic determinations in child custody 
proceedings without the term becoming rigid.115 Further, courts have also 
hoped restrictive rules for determining the meaning of habitual residence 
will not be implemented so “[t]he facts and circumstances of each case 
should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or 
presuppositions.” 116 Nevertheless, the federal courts of appeals in the 
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United States have developed a general guideline to determine a child’s 
habitual residence in a child custody proceeding. The everyday non-legal 
meaning of habitual residence is to be used for interpretation in reference 
to the circumstances of each case.117 Application of the legal meaning of 
habitual residence would promote forum shopping by allowing the 
abducting parent to seek a forum that defines the term in that parent’s 
favor, which contravenes a chief objective of the Convention.118 
The guideline developed by the federal court of appeals includes a 
two-prong analysis to determine a child’s habitual residence to establish 
original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding. The first prong is a 
subjective inquiry of the intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual 
residence, which includes a settled purpose to establish a new habitual 
residence.119 The intent to abandon can be formed after the child has 
been removed from the previous habitual residence, can exist even only 
if he or she in the new environment for a limited period of time, and can 
be implied from actions surrounding the child’s removal. 120 However, 
the intent to abandon must be a past intent.121 Consequently, a future 
intent to return to the child’s previous habitual residence does not 
preserve that country as the child’s habitual residence.122 
The inquiry of the intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual 
residence is where a lack of definition of habitual residence has led to the 
most confusion amongst courts when applying Article 3 of the 
Convention. The majority view is to “focus on the intent of the child’s 
parents or others who may fix the child’s residence,” because “[c]hildren 
. . . normally lack the material and psychological wherewithal to decide 
where they will reside.”123 Accordingly, parental intent serves for that of 
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a child who has not yet reached the maturity to make a competent 
decision as to where to establish a permanent residence.124 
Because separated parents often disagree as to where the child 
should reside, under the majority view, a court must determine the 
parent’s last place of mutual intent for the child’s habitual residence 
based on all available evidence.125 To make such a determination, a court 
must analyze factors that include: 
[P]arental employment in the new country of 
residence; the purchase of a home in the new country 
and the sale of a home in the former country; martial 
stability; the retention of close ties to the former 
country; the storage and shipment of family 
possessions; the citizenship status of the parents and 
children; and the stability of the home environment in 
the new country of residence.126 
A contractual determination of the child’s habitual residence is not 
included as a factor because it would violate the goal of the Convention 
by creating a false jurisdictional link that removes the child from its 
familiar environment. 127 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
took these factors into consideration in determining the habitual 
residence of quadruplets in a child custody proceeding initiated by the 
children’s father in Australia.128 The court based its determination on the 
evidence which demonstrated the children’s mother left personal 
possessions in North Carolina, traveled with tourist visas and reserved 
round-trip tickets for herself and the children, kept American health and 
car insurance, and sought to return to the United States after five weeks 
in Australia. 129  Therefore, the United States, not Australia, was 
determined to be the children’s habitual residence and was granted 
original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody 
proceeding.130 
Still, a mutual intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual 
residence may not exist. When there is no such mutual intent, a court 
should find a change in the child’s habitual residence only when “the 
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objective facts point unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or habitual 
residence being in a particular place” and not based solely on the child’s 
contacts in the new environment. 131  Thus, a change in the child’s 
habitual residence will occur either when the child does not have a 
habitual residence or when the child’s presence is meant for a limited 
period because it is accepted that the child will soon lose connections to 
the previous habitual residence.132 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit was faced with this situation in a child custody proceeding filed 
in the United States by the children’s mother.133 During the time agreed 
upon for the children to complete a year of school in the United States 
and then return to Israel, the children learned English and made 
American friends.134 The court found this evidence did not unequivocally 
point to a change in the children’s habitual residence from Israel to the 
United States at the time the child custody proceeding was filed. 135 
Therefore, Israel, not the United States, could exercise original 
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the proceeding.136 
The minority view regarding the analysis of the intent to abandon 
the child’s previous habitual residence is to conduct a subjective inquiry 
from the child’s perspective.137 This view is premised on the belief that 
the inquiry of the parents’ subjective intent would allow a parent to 
legally abduct a child by conveying an objection to an upcoming 
geographic move.138 Thus, one parent’s express disagreement during a 
geographic move is insufficient to eliminate the intent to abandon the 
child’s previous habitual residence.139 For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit found a mother’s lack of intent to permanently 
remain in Australia and return to the United States if the marriage did not 
improve neither disqualified Australia, where the father had found work, 
as the child’s habitual residence nor prevented Australia from exercising 
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original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody 
proceeding.140 
Similar to the factors considered by a court in determining parental 
intent, factors to determine a child’s intent to abandon a previous 
habitual residence include: 
[T]he family’s change in geography along with their 
personal possessions and pets, the passage of time, the 
family abandoning its prior residence and selling the 
house, the application for and securing of benefits 
only available to . . . immigrants, the children’s 
enrollment in school, and, to some degree, both 
parents’ intentions at the time of the move.141 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit analyzed these factors in 
a child custody proceeding between the father, who lived in the United 
States, and the mother, who lived in Finland.142 The court found evidence 
that the child, who is believed to possess the sole authority to decide 
where to reside, had expressed a desire to remain in the United States 
after a summer vacation with her father. 143 The child also brought a 
majority of her personal possessions to the United States and began 
attending an American school.144 Therefore, the court held that the child 
had abandoned Finland as her habitual residence with a settled purpose 
to establish United States as her new habitual residence.145  Accordingly, 
the United States was granted the authority to establish original 
jurisdiction to the child custody proceeding.146 
The second prong of the analysis to determine a child’s habitual 
residence is whether the child has sufficiently acclimatized to the new 
place of habitual residence to establish a change in the child’s habitual 
residence.147 A change in habitual residence is established if the evidence 
demonstrates the child would be harmed by the removal from the new 
environment, even if the child were to return to the previous 
environment.148 This prong is based on achieving the Convention’s goal 
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of deterring family abduction by maintaining the child’s sense of 
normalcy before the abduction occurred.149 
Yet again, both the Convention and the Supreme Court have failed 
to define the term “acclimatization” in the determination of a child’s 
habitual residence. As a result, courts must analyze several factors to 
determine whether the child has adapted to the new environment, which 
include: (1) the child’s enrollment in school; (2) the child’s participation 
in social activities, such as sports; (3) the child’s length of stay in the 
previous and new environments; (4) the child’s meaningful connections 
in the new environment; (5) the child’s age; and (6) an actual change in 
geography prior to the abduction.150 The child’s cultural ties—as Judge 
M. Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit explained—are not 
considered because “then countless expatriate children around the globe 
would already have satisfied a significant component of the requirements 
for becoming habitual residents of the United States based on an affinity 
for McDonald’s, Mickey Mouse, and Michael Jordan.”151 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed these factors in 
a child custody proceeding to determine the habitual residence of twins 
removed by their mother from France to the United States.152 The court 
found the evidence demonstrated the twins’ socialization in the United 
States—by attending school and building relationships with their 
American relatives—during their ten-month stay outweighed stay 
outweighed the twins’ three-week visit to France. 153 Thus, the twins’ 
time in France was held to be a vacation from the twins’ habitual 
residence in the United States. 154  Therefore, the United States was 
granted original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody 
proceeding.155 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also analyzed 
these factors to determine the habitual residence of a child removed from 
Germany to the United States by the child’s mother, without the father’s 
knowledge. 156  The child was born in Germany, where he remained 
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permanently until his removal to the United States.157 The court held the 
child’s three-day stay on a United States military base did not qualify as 
a change in geography; thus, Germany was the child’s habitual 
residence. 158  Accordingly, only Germany could exercise original 
jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding.159 
Courts have also not established a time period required to satisfy 
the child’s acclimatization to the new environment. In a dissenting 
opinion, Judge Sarokin for the Third Circuit argued that the time period 
is less than one year because of the Convention’s provision preventing a 
child’s return when the proceeding is filed after the child has been in the 
new environment for more than one year. 160  Generally, such a short 
period of time will only be sufficient if the child moves with both parents 
because of the child’s extraordinary adaptability and ability to make 
connections while remaining aware of an already established 
environment.161 
But when the geographic move is intended by one parent to prevent 
acclimatization to the new environment, even a lengthy period of time 
may not be sufficient. 162 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed the time factor in a child custody proceeding where the children 
were removed from the United States to Greece. 163  During the four 
months spent in Greece, where the children had previously only spent 
three or four short vacations, the children lived in three different homes 
and spoke little Greek. 164  The court considered this evidence of the 
children’s irregular home environment during the four-month time period 
as insufficient to establish “deep-rooted ties” to Greece. 165 Therefore, 
Greece was not established as the children’s habitual residence and the 
United States maintained the authority to assert original jurisdiction to 
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding.166 
In determining a child’s habitual residence to establish original 
jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding, a court usually gives each 
prong of the analysis equal weight. The exception is when the child 
custody proceeding involves a child of a young age, who is viewed as 
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lacking the capability to acclimatize to the new environment independent 
of the child’s parent; thus, the parents’ mutual intent as to the child’s 
habitual residence outweighs the child’s acclimatization.167 The rationale 
behind this exception is to prevent the child from being manipulated by 
one parent seeking to alter the child’s habitual residence at the earliest 
possible age, especially if the visit was only intended to be temporary.168 
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in determining 
Canada as the one-year-old child’s habitual residence, held that the 
parents’ shared intentions for the child to live in Canada for two years 
was more important in the determination than the child’s 
acclimatization. 169  Moreover, in cases involving older children, the 
child’s acclimatization to the new environment can overcome the 
absence of the intent to abandon the child’s habitual residence. The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in determining Germany as the seven-
year-old child’s habitual residence, held that the eight months the child 
spent in Germany was sufficient for acclimatization to German life.170 
Hence, the child’s acclimatization to Germany overcame the parent’s 
lack of mutual intent to abandon the United States as the child’s habitual 
residence.171 
IV. THE “BEST APPROACH”: THE UCCJEA’S DEFINED HOME STATE V. 
THE CONVENTION’S UNDEFINED HABITUAL RESIDENCE 
The United States, in drafting the UCCJEA to address domestic 
family abduction, and the signatory countries, in drafting the Convention 
to address international family abduction, both centered the 
establishment of original jurisdiction in child custody proceedings on 
either the child’s home state or the child’s habitual residence. Each 
approach aims to achieve the same three fundamental goals: (1) the 
prevention of the abducting parent to engage in forum shopping as an 
attempt to gain a more sympathetic forum; (2) the litigation of the same 
child custody proceeding in more than one jurisdiction; and (3) the 
encouragement of respect for courts that have properly asserted 
jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding. Both approaches 
primarily seek the return of the wrongfully removed child to his or her 
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most familiar environment, which may be determined by the child’s 
significant connections to the state or country or substantial evidence 
located within the state or country. Under the Convention, the most 
familiar environment may also be determined by the child’s 
acclimatization to the state or country. Often, this state or country 
selected as the child’s most familiar environment is deemed to be the 
most appropriate forum to make a determination in a child custody 
proceeding in order to provide the child with a sense of stability and 
normalcy. Furthermore, each approach seeks uniform interpretation of 
the drafters’ intent of home state or habitual residence based on the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the words used in the text. 
Both the UCCJEA and the Convention analyze similar factors to 
determine the location where the child is most familiar based on the time 
of the abduction and filing of the child custody proceeding. These factors 
include school attendance, location of extended family, and length of 
stay in the state or country. The UCCJEA and the Convention both 
require a majority of the evidence that demonstrates the impact of the 
environment on the child’s development to be located within either the 
state or country that is sought to establish original jurisdiction in the 
child custody proceeding. If all of the evidence is within one state or 
country, this allows for a quick determination of the child’s home state or 
habitual residence to be made because all information required is readily 
available within one jurisdiction. Thus, this requirement ensures that the 
most appropriate forum, which can make a determination in the child’s 
best interest, is granted original jurisdiction in the child custody 
proceeding. Moreover, courts under each approach have the opportunity 
to decline jurisdiction if another location is found to be the more 
appropriate forum. 
There are two key differences between the UCCJEA—which 
defines home state—and the Convention—which does not define 
habitual residence—which have a significant impact on the 
determination of the child’s residence in the child custody proceeding. 
The first difference is the UCCJEA expressly includes a “temporary 
absence” provision in defining the child’s home state to preserve a state’s 
ability to establish original jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding.172 
In the case previously mentioned under the UCCJEA from the Virginia 
Court of Appeals, the “temporary absence” provision preserved Virginia 
as the children’s home state and, therefore, Virginia was granted original 
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jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody proceeding.173 If 
the UCCJEA had not expressly included this provision, it may have been 
possible for a court to find Hungary to be the children’s home state 
because the children had not been in Virginia for six consecutive months 
prior to the filing of the child custody proceeding. As a result, the mother 
in this case would have gained an advantage because Hungary is her 
native country and, therefore, one of the goals of the UCCJEA would 
have been violated. In addition, the children’s best interests would not 
have been protected if such a determination had been made because the 
most appropriate forum, which in this case was Virginia, would not have 
had jurisdiction to make a determination on the merits of the child 
custody proceeding. 
Contrary to the UCCJEA, the Convention’s failure to define 
habitual residence results in the lack of a “temporary absence” provision. 
Such a provision would have been beneficial in the case previously 
mentioned under the Convention from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit.174 Based on the court’s holding that the twins’ three-week visit to 
France did not result in a change of the United States as the twins’ 
habitual residence, it appears the conclusion would have been the same if 
determined under a “temporary absence” provision. However, if a 
“temporary absence” provision were included within the Convention’s 
definition of habitual residence, the court would have been able to make 
the determination more quickly without going into such an in-depth 
analysis of the twins’ time in France. The twins would have benefited 
from a more rapid determination of their habitual residence by allowing 
them to return to the United States as early as possible, and not remain in 
France while the determination was made. 
The inclusion of a “temporary absence” provision within the 
Convention’s definition of habitual residence would also encourage a 
potential parental abductor to behave in a more principled manner. 
Besides the hopeful deterrence of the family abduction in the first 
instance, such a provision could help prevent the parent from making an 
argument that would be expressly prohibited if a “temporary absence” 
provision applied. The parent would be unable to argue that the child has 
acclimatized to the new environment, especially if the child has been in 
the new country for a short period of time, because the parent is or 
should be aware that a short absence from the child’s familiar 
environment does not abandon that country as the child’s habitual 
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residence. The result would be consistent with the Convention’s goal to 
prevent the abducting parent from participating in forum shopping to 
gain a legal advantage in the child custody proceeding by establishing 
jurisdiction in a more sympathetic forum for that parent. 
The second difference is that the UCCJEA’s definition of home 
state limits a court’s inquiry to an objective standard. For example, in the 
case previously mentioned under the UCCJEA from the Supreme Court 
of Texas, the court only used an objective standard to analyze the facts to 
determine that Tennessee, as the child’s home state, could establish 
original jurisdiction to determine the merits of the child custody 
proceeding.175 If the UCCJEA’s definition of home state had not limited 
the court’s inquiry to an objective standard, the mother’s intent of 
remaining in Tennessee would have been considered in the court’s 
determination of the child’s home state. Such a determination would 
most likely have resulted in the original jurisdiction of the child custody 
proceeding being established in Texas. As a result, Tennessee, where the 
child had lived for almost ten months prior to the filing of the child 
custody proceeding, would have been denied the opportunity to 
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding. Thus, the best 
interests of the child would have been deprived of the most appropriate 
forum, which in this case was Tennessee, to establish original 
jurisdiction in the child custody proceeding. 
Conversely, the Convention’s lack of definition of habitual 
residence permits an inquiry of the child’s habitual residence under a 
subjective standard. For example, in the case previously mentioned under 
the Convention from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the 
court subjectively analyzed the mother’s intent to determine the 
quadruplets’ habitual residence was the United States. 176  If the 
Convention had defined habitual residence to limit the court’s inquiry to 
an objective standard, facts such as the mother’s purchase of round-trip 
tickets and retention of American insurance would not have been 
considered in determining the quadruplets’ habitual residence. Yet, there 
is a strong possibility the court may still have found the United States to 
be the quadruplet’s habitual residence because it is where almost all of 
the quadruplets’ young lives were spent. Hence, the most appropriate 
forum to make a determination in the child custody proceeding in the 
child’s best interest still would have been granted original jurisdiction. 
However, the court could have avoided the intense inquiry into the 
                                                                                                             
175Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 326 (Tex. 2005). 
176Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2009). 
2013] Myers 165 
mother’s intention while the quadruplets remained in Australia and the 
quickest possible return to the United States would not have been 
delayed. 
The current interpretation of the Convention reveals a contradiction 
of whether an objective or a subjective standard is preferred to determine 
a child’s habitual residence. A subjective standard is permitted for the 
intent to abandon the child’s previous habitual residence; but, an 
objective standard is used to determine if the facts unequivocally show a 
child’s residence is a particular country. The issue with the subjective 
standard is that it becomes a complicated inquiry of the child’s mind, the 
parent’s mind, or both, when determining the child’s residence. Such a 
standard will almost certainly lead to differing results because the inquiry 
predominantly becomes a fact-intensive analysis based 
disproportionately on circumstantial evidence and not necessarily based 
on the most appropriate forum to serve the child’s best interest. The 
objective inquiry approach, as used in UCCJEA based cases, still allows 
the facts and circumstances of each individual case to remain the center 
of the determination of the child’s residence while providing a sense of 
jurisdictional certainty. Because greater importance is placed on avoiding 
disruption to the child’s environment unless required by law under the 
Convention, children who are victims of family abduction would benefit 
from a definition of habitual residence that eliminates the subjective 
approach. 
A change in the text of the Convention—to define the child’s 
habitual residence—would benefit the children who are victims of family 
abduction. Although the current interpretation appears to achieve the 
fundamental goals of the Convention, a definition of habitual residence 
can accelerate the establishment of original jurisdiction in the most 
appropriate forum in child custody proceedings while creating uniformity 
of judicial interpretation and application of the Convention. Such a 
definition would also preserve the child’s familial values when the 
family environment in which the child is most familiar, prior to the 
family abduction, is restored in a prompt manner. The Convention could 
benefit from using the UCCJEA’s definition of “home state” as a guide 
to define “habitual residence” while retaining construction of the term 
most appropriately for family abduction within the international 
community. For instance, signatories of the Convention would be able to 
protect themselves as a wrongfully removed child’s habitual residence by 
adopting a similar “temporary absence” provision. Thus, the country 
would remain the child’s habitual residence during the time required for 
another signatory country to become the child’s habitual residence. 
Additionally, because removing a child across international borders may 
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have a greater negative impact on the child, the international approach 
may consider adopting a longer period of time than six months, as used 
in the UCCJEA, to establish a habitual residence prior to the 
commencement of the child custody proceeding. There may be a concern 
that different signatory countries could apply different cultural meanings 
while interpreting the definition of habitual residence, which would 
prevent jurisdictional uniformity. However, this can be avoided, and 
jurisdictional uniformity achieved, if the definition of habitual residence 
adopts the United States’ approach of excluding cultural ties. 
A definition of habitual residence would also create a more 
stringent standard in establishing original jurisdiction in child custody 
proceedings in cases involving international family abduction. The 
current fear expressed by courts in the United States that habitual 
residence would become too rigid if defined has resulted in almost too 
much judicial discretion to use any factor or approach deemed 
appropriate under the circumstances to determine the child’s habitual 
residence. As a result, even different federal courts within the United 
States have used unpredictable and inconsistent formulations to 
determine a child’s habitual residence to establish original jurisdiction in 
a child custody proceeding. A definition of habitual residence would 
result in a uniform standard and jurisdictional certainty, especially if the 
definition was drafted as clearly and unambiguously as possible. 
Furthermore, courts would retain flexibility without being required to 
meet precise standards if, as under the UCCJEA, the definition of 
habitual residence permits courts to decline jurisdiction if the abducting 
parent is found to have manipulated the law by participating in forum 
shopping or if another court is held to be a more appropriate forum to 
determine the merits of the child custody proceeding. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are benefits and disadvantages to defining habitual residence 
in the text of the Convention. When the fundamental goals of the 
Convention are considered, most importantly the prompt return of a child 
wrongfully removed, children who are victims of family abduction 
would benefit from having habitual residence defined. A definition 
would prevent the child’s prolonged stay where the child has been 
wrongfully removed by allowing the determination of the child’s 
habitual residence to be made in a swifter manner than if the term is left 
undefined. Although judicial confusion in interpretation and application 
of the Convention may not be completely eliminated, courts will benefit 
from a defined term because it will result in uniform jurisdictional 
certainty within the United States. This jurisdictional certainty can also 
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be achieved worldwide if the United States’ view that a child’s cultural 
ties are not to be considered in determining a habitual residence is 
followed. The courts’ current complicated analysis, including the two-
pronged test that requires sub-inquiries to determine a child’s habitual 
residence, would be eliminated if the term were to be defined. Most 
importantly, a definition will help ensure that the most appropriate forum 
can establish original jurisdiction and determine the merits of the child 
custody proceeding in the child’s best interest. 
